The Revenues-Expenditures Nexus: Evidence from Local Government Data by Douglas Holtz-Eakin et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THE REVENUES—EXPENDITURES NEXUS:




Working Paper No. 2180




We are grateful to Maria San Segundo for assistance with the
computations and to Research Services at Princeton University for
help in acquiring the data. We thank Gary Chamberlain, James
Poterba, and members of Princeton's Industrial Relations Seminar
for useful comments. This research was supported in part by NSF
Grants SES-8419238 and SES-841O249. The research reported here is
part of the NBER's research program in Taxation. Any opinions
expressed are those of the authors and not those of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #2180
March 1987
The Revenues—Expenditures Nexus:
Evidence from Local Government Data
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the intertemporal linkages between local government
expenditures and revenues, In the terminology that has become standard in
the literature on vector autoregression analysis, the issue is whether
revenues Granger—cause expenditures, or expenditures Granger—cause revenues.
The main results that emerge from an analysis of fiscal data from 171
municipal governments over the period 1972—1980 are that: 1) one or two
years are sufficient to summarize the relevant dynamic interrelationships; 2)
there are important intertemporal linkages between expenditures, taxes and
grants; and 3) past revenues help predict current expenditures, but past
expenditures do not alter the future path of revenues. This last finding is
contrary to results that have emerged from previous analyses of federal
fIscal data, and hence suggests the need for additional research on the
differences in the processes generating local and federal decisions.
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The significance of intertemporal linkages between government
expenditures and revenues has been discussed both by economists and political
scientists. As von Furstenberg, Green and Jeong [1985, 1986] observe, three
hypotheses have been advanced:
1.Revenues change concurrently with expenditures. Such a pattern
would result If each year the citizens of a jurisdiction (or their
representatives) simultaneously select taxes and expenditures using the
standard calculus for weighing marginal benefits and costs. Theoretical
models generating such behavior are Lindahi's [1958] model of benefit
taxation, or the well—known median voter rule. (Black [1948].)
2.Taxes change before spending. To see how this sequence might
emerge, consider a government controlled by individuals who want to expand
its size beyond that desired by the citizenry. (Niskanen [1976).) In the
presence of statutory or constitutional rules prohibiting deficits, how can
public sector managers increase spending? According to this story, the
answer Is that they must wait for revenues to increase, and then increase
expenditures.1 A state senator from New Jersey put it this way: "It is
axiomatic that government spending will rise to meet and eventually exceed
available revenues."2 However, nonsynchronous changes in expenditures and
revenues need not be associated with any "failure" in the political process.
For example, taxes might change before spending if a community decides to
save for anticipated future expenditures by raising taxes prior to the time
those expenditures are made.
3.Spending changes before taxes. According to this story, some
special event creates a "need" for an Increase in expenditures.3 Rather than
cut other expenditues, public sector managers convince voters that the only
1way to balance the budget is through increased taxes. Buchanan [1960] notes
that this view has a long pedigree; its proponents included members of the
nineteenth century Italian school° of public finance. But just as in the
case of hypothesis 2, this pattern can be rationalized by an Intertemporal
decision—making model.
Each of the 3 hypotheses has a straightforward Implication In terms of
the time series properties of expenditures and revenues. Under the second
hypothesis, for example, one would expect to find that past levels of
revenues help predict current expenditure levels. In the same way, according
to the third hypothesis, past expenditures help predict current revenues. In
the terminology that has become standard In the literature on vector
autoregression (VAR) analysis, the issue is whether revenues Granger-cause
expenditures, or expenditures Granger-cause revenues. We emphasize that in
adopting this terminology, It Is not our Intention to take sides in the
debate over whether vector autoregression results reveal anything about
causalIty" In a philosophically meaningful sense. However, for the sake of
readability, we will henceforth refrain from putting quotation marks around
that word.
In two important recent papers, von Furstenberg, Green and Jeong [1985],
[1986] (hereafter FGJ) used VAR's to analyze expenditure and revenue data of
the federal government. Their 1985 paper examined state and local spending
as well. FGJ's basic finding was that taxes did not cause aggregate
spending, but there was some weak support for the reverse sequence, that
spending helps predict taxes.
As FGJ [1986] note, federal fiscal data may be Inappropriate
for testing the various political economy hypotheses listed above:
"...[O]nly that part of any change in fiscal magnitudes which is not accepted
2as part of cyclical or price-level stabilization designs can be expected to
hold messages for the other side of the budget." Thus, VAR's "would be
biased against finding support in past data for the...proposition that
spending can be pulled along by prior tax action, unless changes in the
average aggregate tax rates were adjusted for movements in cyclical factors
and inflation" (p. 181).
FGJ's solution to this problem Is to adjust the cyclically sensitive time
series for concurrent cyclical effects by regressing each one on the GNP gap
and the inflation rate, and then using the residuals in subsequent VAR
analyses.4 It's hard to think of a much better way to deal with this
problem. Yet one wonders about its adequacy, particularly in light of the
well-known difficulties in measuring the timing and severity of the business
cycle. Just how does one measure potential GNP; is this a better measure
than the deviation of the actual from the permanent rate of unemployment;
etc.? In short, the fact that the federal government carries on its
stabilization function concurrently with its other fiscal activities will
tend to confound attempts to link intertemporal patterns in fiscal variables
to various views of the budget process.
In contrast, state and local governments are not in the business of
counter—cyclical policy. In their 1985 paper, FGJ examine fiscal data on the
state and local public sector as a whole. Here the problem is whether it is
appropriate to aggregate all state and local governments into one unit.
After all, the various governments differ with respect to the functions they
perform, their budgetary processes, the political environments in which the
operate, etc.
In this paper we apply VAR techniques to data from individual local
governments to study the revenues-expenditures nexus. Hence, neither
3stabilization issues nor aggregation problems impede interpretation of the
results. To anticipate our main conclusion, we find that past revenues help
to predict current expenditures, but past expenditures do not alter the
future path of revenues.
Typically, VAR methods are applied to relatively long time series. No
comparable fiscal data for individual communities are available. We have
assembled a nine year panel with information on 171 municipal governments.
VAR techniques can be applied to such data sets, but It requires confronting
some Interesting econometric problems. These are discussed In Section II.
The results are presented In Section III, and Section IV contains a summary
and conclusions.
II. Econometric Issues5
We begin by considering causality tests in their usual time series
context. The issue is to determine the causal relationship between the
detrended variables x and y, on which the investigator has a large number of
observations. The variable x is said to not (Granger) cause the variable y
If:
(2.1) =E{yy_1,y_2,...,y1}
where E{.I•} denotes a linear projection. Intuitively, if on&s prediction
of y, given the history of y, cannot be improved by Including the history of
x, then x does not cause
Essentially, the procedure is to estimate a regression of the form:
m n
(2.2) = a0+E +EkXt_k +ut
k=1
where the &s and cS's are parameters and the lag lengths m and n are
sufficient to ensure that ut Is a white noise error. While It is not
essential that m equal n, we follow typical practice by assuming that they
4are identical. The test of whether x causes y is simply a test of the joint
hypothesis that 51=52=•••=5m are all equal to zero. This can be done by
using standard F-tests; a good example is FGJ's study of fiscal data.
To perform the test, there must be enough observations on x and y to
obtain consistent estimates of the parameters in equation (2.2). Panel
data generally do not have the requisite number of observations. Instead,
there often are a great number of cross-sectional units, but only a few years
worth of data on each unit. To estimate any parameters, investigators
typically pool data from different units, a procedure which imposes the
constraint that the underlying structure is the same for each cross—sectional
unit.
Given this ,whynot simply stack all the time series-cross section
observations together and use them to estimate equation (2.2)? The main
pitfall of such a procedure is that it ignores the possibility that each unit
has an "Individual effect"——which translates In practice to its own
intercept. The individual effect summarizes the Influence of unobserved
variables which have a persistent effect on the dependent variable. For
example, a community's expenditures each period might be affected by its
geographical location or its "political make-up." To the extent that the
other right hand side variables are correlated with the individual effect,
its omission results In Inconsistent estimates. Although there are standard
methods for estimating individual effects, they are not appropriate for our
problem.
To see why, assume that there are N cross-sectional units observed over T
periods. Let I Index the cross—sectional observations and t the time
periods. Assume further the existence of an Individual effect (fi) for the
ith cross—sectional unit. The model Is:
5(2.3) it =+jt- + xt_ ++ =1,...,N — — t=
Ifthe x's and y's require detrending, equation (2.3) can be augmented with a
time trend. Estimation and identification are not complicated by this addi-
tion; hence, for simplicity, it is suppressed below.
A standard method of estimating the individual effect is to first
difference the data to eliminate f1 and then use ordinary or generalized least
squares to estimate the differenced equation:
(2.4)-= a(y-1)
+ -xt__i)
+ (Uit —u.t_i) 1
t=(m+2),...,T
A quick examination of equation (2.4) indicates the flaw with this approach in
the current context: because depends on uit_l, the error tern
(ut —Ujt)
is correlated with the regressor (Yft1 —
Thefact that differencing can induce a simultaneity problem is well
known from the conventional literature on time series analysis and has been
explored in a panel data context. (See, e.g., Chamberlain [1983].) The
usual solution is to employ an instrumental variables estimator. Here, too,
this turns out to appropriate, but it is implemented in a different fashion
than is typical. This is because, as we note below, the variables which are
legitimate candidates for use as instrumental variables change over time.7
The most straightforward way to motivate an estimation procedure for the
system (2.4) is to discuss its identification. The criterion we use for
identification is that there must be a sufficient number of instrumental
variables to allow estimation of the equation in question. This leads
directly to an instrumental variables estimator which has a generalized least
squares (GLS) interpretation.
6We begin by assuming that, as usual, the error term, is uncor—
related with all past values of y and x, and the individual effect:
(2.5) E{y5ut} =E(XISUt} = E[fut}
=0,s <t.
The orthogonal ity conditions (2.5) can be used to Identify the parameters of
(2.4), since the disturbance term v. (=u.
—ujt_i)will be uncorrelated
with and for s >2.The equation for each time period t has 2m
right—hand side variables. To identify the parameters, there must be at least
this many instrumental variables. The 2(t-2) variables
x.1_2,...x11] are available as Instrumental variables to estimate the equa-
tion for time period t. Thus, to have at least as many Instrumental variables
as right—hand side variables, it must be true that 2(t-2) >2m,or t >m+2.8
Given our assumed lag structure, It Is Impossible to estimate the
equations (2.4) for time periods before t =m+2.Thus, these equations are
ignored. Clearly, the decision about which equations to "ignore" depends
crucially on assumptions concerning lag length. If we make an incorrect
assumption and truncate the lag distribution, the parameter estimates will be
inconsistent. This creates a potential identification problem when the lag
length is unknown. We do not present a general treatment of the problem, and
instead use only the straightforward restriction Implicitly Imposed above:
that If the largest lag length is m, then the number of time periods T is
greater than m-i-2.
These considerations suggest the following estimation procedure. Make
some assumption on the lag length, m. Think of (2.4) as a system of (1-rn-i)
equations with constraints across equations, namely, the &s and 5's are the
same in each equation. (This assumption will be relaxed below.) An
efficient estimator can be formed in three steps: I) Estimate the equations
for each time period using 2SLS. Unlike the standard case, however, the list
7of instrumental variables is not the same for each equation, because, as
noted above, the list of variables uncorrelated with the errors changes each
period. ii) Using the residuals and the matrix of instruments, estimate the
joint covariance of the error terms. iii) Estimate all the parameters
simultaneously using generalized least squares on the stacked equations.
Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen [1985] provide explicit formulas. They also
show that in this model linear constraints can be tested In the conventional
way, i.e., by noting that the difference in the constrained and unconstrained
sum of squared residuals has a x2 distribution. In the current context,
linear constraints are associated with three particularly interesting
questions:
1.Are the parameters stationary over time? Equation (2.4), like
virtually all work analyzing panel data, assumes that the parameters are
constant not only across different units, but also over time. Similarly,
each Individual effect is time invariant. A more general specification is to
allow all of the parameters to depend on the time period:
(2.6) = +EaLtyltL + 1txit_L + + ult [t=(1),...T],
where is the parameter multiplying the individual effect.9 Because of the
one cannot simply difference away the individual effect. However, fol-
lowing Chamberlain [1983], we can multiply the equation for time period
t by (÷1/iI), and then subtract it from the equation for period t+1:
m+1 rn-Fl
(2.7)yft =at














Observe that in each of the equations in (2.7) there are 2(m+1) right hand
side variables other than the constant, or a total of (2m+3). To identify
the parameters of (2.7) an equal number of instrumental variables is
required. Since the Instrumental variables vector is
"lt-2'"
it is now required that t ￿m÷3 tohave a sufficient number of instrumental
variables for the equation for time period t. Thus, as one would suspect,
allowing for time varying parameters makes identification more difficult.
Nevertheless, the basic estimating procedure discussed above can still be
employed. Specifically, one can: i) choose a relatively large value of m
to be sure to avoid truncating the lag structure inappropriately (we discuss
below how to find the °best11 value of m); ii) estimate the model with and
without parameter stationarity; and iii) compare the sums of squared
residuals.
2. What is the correct lag length, ni? Denote by rn the relatively large
9value of m used for initial estimation of the model. Re—estimate the
system (2.4) or (2.7) (whichever is appropriate) with m =(m—1).If the
increase in the sum of squared residuals is "large," then in= in isaccepted.
If the increase is "sniall," then try in= (—2).Continue testing suc—
cessively smaller lag lengths until one is rejected by the data, or m =0.
3.Does x cause y? In the model with stationary coefficients,
(equation (2.4)), this is simply a test of the joint hypothesis i =2=
== 0.In the model with nonstationary coefficients the same procedure
can be applied to the d2,t of equation (2.7). As (2.7a) makes clear, all the
's being zero implies that all the d's are zero.
III. Investigating the Revenues-Expenditures Nexus
A. Preliminaries: The Role of Grants
In this section we employ the techniques discussed in Section II to
investigate the characteristics of the VAR's for local governments' revenues
and expenditures. An important source of funds for localities is grants from
state and federal governments. Both theoretical considerations and earlier
econometric work suggest that grants from other levels of government affect
communities' fiscal decisions differently than own source revenues. (See
Inman [1.979].) We therefore Include lagged grants as right hand side
variables.
The Inclusion of grants in our analysis not only facilitates examination
of our main concern, the revenues-expenditures nexus, but also allows us to
gain insights into some other controversial aspects of local public finance.
In previous econometric investigations of local government expenditures, an
Important empirical regularity is the "flypaper effect": a dollar increase in
exogenous grant monies stimulates local spending more than a dollar increase
in local income. (See Inman [1979].) One interpretation of this result
10turns on the hypothesis that local bureaucrats, for a variety of reasons,
seek to increase the amount of public spending beyond the level desired by
the representative voter. Assuming further that the bureaucrats have better
information than voters on the magnitude of outside grants, the bureaucrats
may "trick" the voters into supporting larger expenditures than they might
otherwise permit.
As far as we know, all evidence on the flypaper effect comes from
cross—sectional analysis of local governments. The dynamic and stochastic
properties of local revenue, grant, and spending streams have not been
explored In a panel context. A straightforward dynamic reinterpretation of
the flypaper effect Is that grant monies cause (in the sense discussed above)
local expenditure.
In discussions of intergovernmental grants, it is common to distinguish
between lump sum grants and matching grants. Investigators such as Craig and
Inman [1982], who examine the contemporaneous relationship between grants and
spending, have correctly noted that since matching grants have price effects,
they cannot simply be combined together with lump sum grants to form a single
"grants variable." However, in the context of causality testing this
distinction Is a non-issue. To be sure, in the presence of matching rates,
Innovations In grants and expenditures may be correlated. Nevertheless, the
existence of matching rates puts no restrictions on the way In which current
expenditures respond to past innovations.10
B. Data
Our data are drawn from the Annual Survey of Governments between 1973 and
1980 and the Census of Governments conducted in 1972 and 1977. A random
sample of municipal government records was selected from the data tape for
1979 (the year with the least coverage) and these same government records
11were selected for the remaining eight years when possible.'1 There is usable
information on 171 municipal governments over a period of nine (fiscal) years.
In each year, the record for each government essentially presents the
budget identity-—including revenues from a variety of sources, expenditures
by program and type (current, capital, etc.), debt transactions, grant
receipts (by source), and grant transfers (of minimal Importance at the
municipal level.) These dollar amounts were converted to per capita real
dollars using a regional price index with December 1977 =100.All variables
are entered as natural logarithms.
The data contained virtually no Information on the economic and
demographic characteristics of the communities. Such variables typically
play an important role In regression analyses of local government spending.
(See Inman [979].) However, to the extent that economic and demographic
characteristics can be regarded as "individual effects," this absence of
information will cause no problems. In essence, the statistical procedure
discussed in Section II eliminates these effects via differencing. In
addition, every equation contains a dummy variable for each year. The
system of dummies will capture any underlying trend in the data, as well as
important macroeconomic influences common to all jurisdictions in a given
year.
The results presented here use total local current expenditures, total
local revenues, and total grants received. Less aggregative work focusing on
specific revenue and expenditure categories is presented in Holtz—Eakin
[1986].
C. Estimation and Testing
Our focus is on the dynamic interrelationships between three variables:
expenditures, revenues, and grants. First, we estimate a model in which
12expenditures appear on the left hand side, and on the right hand side are its
own lags and lags of the other two variables. Next we do the same thing for
revenues.12 The results are used to investigate issues of parameter
stationarity, lag length, and causation.
Expenditures. We begin by estimating an equation with 2 lags of each of
the right hand side variables; in terms of our earlier notation, m=2.13 The
quasi—differenced version, then, has three lags. Given that in our data T=9,
m=2 implies that we can estimate parameters for only the last five years in
the data set; I.e., t=1976,...,1980. When the equations for these years are
estimated jointly using the three-stage procedure described above, the
minimized value of the x2 test statistic, which we denote Q, Is equal to
1.99, and has 30 degrees of freedom.14 (For convenience, this result and
others to follow are summarized in Table 1.) Now, Inferences about causality
will be Incorrect If the lag distribution is incorrectly truncated and/or
parameter stationarity is incorrectly imposed. In order to avoid these (type
II) errors, we choose 10% significance levels for the tests on lag length and
parameter stationarity, rather than the conventional 5% or 1% levels. Because
the value of the x0 at the 10% level Is 40.26, we can easily accept m=2.
When we examined the coefficients of this specification, we noticed that
most of them were quite small relative to their standard errors. To see if
we could sharpen the results by putting more structure on the model, we
imposed the condition that the coefficients on the Individual effects be
stationary, i.e., that rt from (2.7a) be unity for all t. The value of Q
from this restriction is 3.54. Therefore, the value of the appropriate test
statistic, denoted L, Is 3.54 (restricted Q) minus 1.99 (unrestricted Q),
or 1.55. There are nine degrees of freedom because there are four




_______ L Freedom x2
i) m=2 1.99 - 30 40.26
ii) stationary fixed effects
(given i) 3.54 1.55 9 14.68
iii) all parameters stationary
(given ii) 46.48 42.94 30 40.26
iv) m=1 (given ii) 19.03 15.49 18 25.99
v) m=O (given ii) 108.44 89.41 18 25.99
vi) exclude revenues (given iv) 39.41 20.38 6 12.6
vii) exclude grants (given iv) 32.72 13.69 6 12.6
*For lines i through v, x2 Is evaluated at the 0.10 significance level;
for lines vi and vii, at the 0.05 significance level.
14the third lag of each variable. The associated critical value
of x at a .10 significance level is 14.68; hence, the model with stationary
individual effects passes the test by a wide margin. (See line ii of
Table 1.)
Are all the parameters similarly stationary over time? When we impose
this constraint, the associated value of Q is 46.48. In this case, then, L =
46.48—3.54,or 42.94, and has 30 degrees of freedom. (There are 30 degrees
of freedom because the six lag parameters for each of 1975 through 1979 are
constrained equal to their 1980 values.) The critical value of the
x0 distribution at the 0.10 level Is 40.26. We therefore reject the
hypothesis that all coefficients are stationary across time.
We next investigate results relating to lag length (conditional on the
assumption that rt=1). The first question is whether the data will permit us
to shorten the lag length from two to one. When we Impose m=1, the value of
Q Is 19.03. Comparing this to the value of Q in line ii of Table 1, we find
that L =15.49,and has 18 degrees of freedom. (There are 18 degrees of
freedom because we are restricting three lags in each of six years.) The
critical value of the distribution at the 0.10 level is 25.99. We can
accept the restriction that one lag In each variable adequately character-
izes the data.
The fact that m=1 passes the test gives rise to the thought that an even
more parsimonious specification, m=0, might do so as well. When we estimate
the expenditures equation with no lags at all, the value of Q jumps to
108.44; the associated value of L is 89.41 (108.44 -19.03).The data
clearly reject this hypothesis by a wide margin. (See line v of Table 1.)
Conditional on m=1 and stationary fixed effects, we next turn to
15causality issues. As noted above, to test whether revenues cause
expenditures, we simply estimate the expenditures equation excluding
revenues, and evaluate the increase In the minimum x2 test statistic. The
value of Q when revenues are excluded Is 39.41; the value of L is 39.41 minus
19.03, or 20.38, and It has six degrees of freedom. (There are six degrees
of freedom because the coefficient on the lagged value of revenues in each
year 1975-1980 is restricted to equal zero.) The critical value of the x
distribution at the 0.05 level is 12.6; hence, the data reject by a wide
margin the notion that revenues do not cause expenditures.
When we estimate the expenditures equation excluding grants, we find
that Q =32.72,L =13.69,and the hypothesis of non-causality is again
rejected, although by a smaller margin.
To summarize: We find that community expenditures can be described by a
dynamic process which has only one year lags. The Individual effects are
stationary across time periods, but the other parameters (taken as a group)
are not. Further, one can reject the hypothesis that revenues do not cause
expenditures.
Revenues. The procedures for analyzing revenues are very similar to
those for expenditures, which were just described In detail. We therefore
briefly summarize the results which are reported in Table 2: (a) A lag
length of two Is at least sufficient to characterize the data (see line I).
(b) Given m=2, one cannot reject the hypothesis that all the parameters are
stationary across time periods (see lines ii and iii). (c) One can reject
the hypothesis that m=1 (see line Iv). (d) One cannot reject the hypothesis
that expenditures do not cause revenues (line v), but one can reject the
hypothesis that grants do not cause revenues (line vi).




_____ L Freedom ______
i)m=2 1.24 30 40.26
ii) stationary fixed effects
(given 1) 3.49 2.25 9 14.68
iii) all parameters
stationary (given ii) 24.13 20.64 30 40.26
iv) m=1 (given iii) 47.23 23.10 3 6.25
v) exclude expenditures
(given III) 25.43 1.3 2 5.99
vi) exclude expenditures
and grants 47.37 23.24 4 9.49
*For lines I through iv, x2 Is evaluated at the 0.10 significance level;
for lines v and vi at the 0.05 significance level.
17estimates of the expenditures and revenues equations.15 In Table 3, for most
cases we report the lag coefficients of the most parsimonious specification
of each equation that is consistent with the data, based on the discussions
surrounding Tables 1 and 2. Table 3 suggests the following thoughts:
1.While the processes generating expenditures and revenues share the
important characteristic of a stationary individual effect, they differ with
respect to lag length and whether the lag parameters change over time. More
coefficients are reported for expenditures than for revenues, because only
for the latter are all the parameters stationary over time.
2. In general, parameter statlonarity can be rejected for one of two
reasons. Either the estimates are qualitatively "close" but are precisely
estimated, or the parameters differ greatly in magnitude even If they are
individually estimated without much precision. The former seems roughly to
be the case In the expenditures equation.
3.As noted earlier, the data suggest that expenditures do not cause
revenues. For the sake of completeness, however, we have reported the
coefficients of lagged expenditures In the revenues equation.16 It is
interesting to note that' in addition to being statistically insignificant,
they are small In magnitude compared to most of the other coefficients In the
revenues equation. From either perspective, past expenditures are not an
"important" determinant of revenues.
4.Analysis of the dynamic behavior of the system as a whole is
complicated by the non-stationarity of the estimated coefficients. For
example, examination of steady state multipliers is not meaningful when the
coefficients are changing over time. Is our equation mispecifled, or does





Et_i0.0981 (.786) Et_i0.170(.185) Et_i 0.054(.202)
Et_2 Et_2 Et_2 0.054(.051)
Rt.i0.988(.616) Rt..10.628(.208) Rt_i 0.543(.179)
Rt_2 Rt_2 Rt_2-0.019(.0245)














Gt_i—0.145 (.0576) Gt_i—0.176 (.141)
Gt_2 Gt_2
*Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
19point we simply do not know. However, this finding does create concerns
about analyses that impose stationarity without ever testing it.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
A number of results have emerged from our analysis of local
expenditures and revenues data: 1.) The figures from the lag truncation
tests suggest that lags of one or two years are sufficient to summarize the
dynamic interrelationships In local public finance. In other words, a
sufficient Information set to characterize the correlations in the data is
just one or two years. 2.) There are Important Intertemporal linkages among
expenditures, taxes, and grants. The existence of such linkages suggests
that hypothesis number 1 In the introduction--revenues change only
concurrently with expenditures--is incorrect. This finding casts doubt upon
the interpretation of standard regressions that examine only contemporaneous
relationships among fiscal variables. 3.) The results from the stationarity
tests suggest that it is dangerous, as is common, to assume that all
parameter estimates from panel data do not change over time. 4.) Past
revenues help to predict current expenditures, but past expenditures do not
alter the future path of revenues.
The last of these findings is particularly interesting in the context of
von Furstenberg, Green and Jeong's results. FGJ [1986] find that taxes do
not Granger—cause spending, and view this as evidence against "...the
tactical supply-side proposition, that spending can be pulled along by prior
tax action" (p. 181). If one is willing to impose this interpretation upon
the VAR results, then our examination of disaggregated local government data
suggests that this "tactical supply-side proposition" is consistent with
historical experience. Why do the results for local and federal government
20differ? Is It because of the difficulties inherent to abstracting from the
federal government's attempts to pursue countercyclical fiscal policies? Or
are there fundamental differences in the processes generating local and
federal decisions? These are important topics for future research.
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23Footnotes
1This leaves open the question of why citizens do not require their
representatives to rebate any tax revenues in excess of optimal
expenditures. There are a number of theories which attempt to explain
non-responsiveness of this kind; such models tend to emphasize the costs that
voters must Incur to obtain the relevant information and oust non-responsive
incumbents. See, e.g., Atkinson and Stiglltz [1980, Chap. 10].
2New York Times, New Jersey Weekly, March 17, 1985, p. 22.
3Most state and local governments face balanced budget rules, although it is
not clear they serve as an effective limit on current expenditure. See Inman
[1983].
4More specifically, first differences in the variables are employed, and a
dummy variable is Included to account for anomalous fiscal behavior in the
year 1975.
5See Holtz—Eakln, Newey and Rosen [1985] for additional details on
Identification, estimation, and inference in this class of model.
6The discussion generalizes easily to the case where there Is more than one
right hand side variable.
7One should also note that heteroskedasticity is likely to be a problem in
the panel context—-different units may be expected to have error terms with
unequal variances. Efficient estimation and correct formulae for standard
errors require that heteroskedasticity be taken Into account.
8A sufficient condition for identification is that in the limit the
cross-product matrix between the Instruments and the right hand side
variables be nonsingular.
9A special case which may be of particular interest occurs when the a's and
6's are time Invariant, but $ is not.
10Alternatlvely, matching rates do not change the "reduced form"
relationship, which is all that matters for Granger-causality. However, the
matching rates are embedded In the coefficients, so they would have to be
taken into account If one attempted to recover the coefficients of the
underlying "structural model."
11To remain In the sample, communities had to report positive school
expenditures.
12For the sake of completeness, we also estimated a model with grants on the
left hand side. These results are available upon request.
2413We begin at m=2 in order to estimate the covariance matrix necessary to
test for this and other (including larger) lag lengths. However, it is
obvious from the test statistic that the restriction m=2 is consistent with
the data. This also turns out to be true for the revenues equation.
'4The calculation of degrees of freedom is as follows: For 1980, we have
available 7 years of data for each variable (1972—1978). Adding a constant
gives 22 instrumental variables. This number falls to 19 in 1979, 16 in
1978, and so forth. Thus, the total number of instrumental variables is 22 +
19+16+13+10=80.For each year we estimate 10 parameters; for a total
of 50. The degrees of freedom is simply the difference: 80-50.
151o conserve space, the coefficients of the unrestricted equations are not
reported; these are available upon request, as are the results for the grants
equation.
16When expenditures are excluded from the equation, the other coefficients
barely change. The coefficients on Rt_i, Rt_2 Gti and Gt_2, respectively, a
are 0.567 (.122), —0.00677 (.0216), -0.156 (.0575), and -0.0833 (.018).
25